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The aim of the article is to analyse the strategic choices made in international relations 
by a smaller state that does not has the status of great powers and  participates within the 
structures of the European Union. In the theoretical part of this article, a survey of selected 
theories presents the role of smaller states and their basic geopolitical strategic choices. It 
seems that the most commonly used strategy for smaller states is bandwagoning, i.e. attaching 
oneself to a great power in exchange for support and protection. Another basic strategy is 
called balancing. It is usually defined as an attempt to balance the influence and geopolitical 
clout of an overly strong actor. The variant of balancing is an attempt to build an alternative 
geopolitical core, composed of smaller countries in the region. Another variant is an attempt to 
“bind” powers in a framework of institutionalized international cooperation, preferably in the 
EU. An important strategy is buck-passing, which involves pushing responsibility to others. Yet 
another is appeasement, which involves giving in to the demands of the dominant state, and 
final approach may be the accumulation of wealth. In the empirical part, Poland’s geopolitical 
strategy is analysed, taking into account the European integration in that strategy.
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Introduction
The aim of the article is to analyse the strategic choices made in international rela-
tions by smaller state that do not have the status of great power, and is involved within 
the structures of regional integration. The analysis will focus on the country that has low 
international standing, because of their geographical location and of its small geopolitical 
potential. It seems that Poland, because of its relatively small geopolitical (i. e. economic, 
demographic, military, etc.) potential, and because of its location on the eastern border of 
the European Union may be regarded as an example of such a state. The specific, to some 
extent peripheral location of Poland is underscored by the fact that it is situated on the 
border of two geopolitical blocks, i. e. between the West (whose core members are the US 
and biggest EU countries) and Russia and its sphere of influence2. Poland’s location is also 
adjacent to other peripheral countries that are the scene of rivalry between Russia and the 
West (among these countries, Ukraine is the most important case in point).
1 This article is based on research conducted under the grant of the National Science Centre, Poland 
no. 2015/17/B/HS5/00486.
2 Russian sphere of influence is related to former Soviet Union republics, and in the 21st century 
may regard the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. 
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Studies of international relations often focus on the role of great powers, as those 
countries obviously have the greatest impact on shaping the international order and geo-
political relations. Scholars pay much less attention to smaller countries, especially those 
considered to be peripheral. In the theoretical part of this article, I will attempt to answer 
the question what are strategic choices made in the area of foreign policy that can boost 
the influence of smaller states in the geopolitical order and improve their autonomy in 
relation to regional and global powers. After these theoretical considerations, I will move 
to analyse Poland’s presence in the EU in the light of the considerations outlined above. 
I will analyse Poland’s geopolitical strategy in recent years3, starting from the country’s 
accession to the EU in 2004 and ending my analysis at the end of 2015. In analysing Po-
land’s geopolitical strategy, I will be interested primarily in evidence of long-term actions 
in relations with Poland’s most important allies both within the EU and beyond, with the 
main geographical directions and objectives of Poland’s foreign policy, as well as with the 
biggest threats defined by decision-makers. 
Methods to have more autonomy
There are various factors to consider in order to analyse ways in which smaller states 
can increase their autonomy. In realist terms, the stability of the geopolitical system is of 
the fundamental importance. The more stable the system, the higher the security of the 
subordinated states, but also the lower their political autonomy. Signs of weakening of the 
leading powers or of rising influence of other, aspiring actors can be seen as symptoms 
of destabilisation. In structural terms, the evidence of this process would be a change of 
geopolitical potentials between the great powers, leading to a reconfiguration of power 
relations between them, or even to replacing the old system of international institutions 
with a new one. A period of destabilization would potentially create a window of opportu-
nity when the hitherto dominated countries could increase their autonomy, but it would 
also increase the risk of war and other costs resulting from the change in the international 
order. Such change most often allows small or peripheral countries to emancipate them-
selves from the control of one power only to fall under the spell of another power. There-
fore, it would not necessarily lead to a substantial increase of international autonomy of 
smaller countries.
Some realists argue that a bipolar order is always more stable than multipolar [4; 5, 
p. 5]. In turn, the proponents of the liberal paradigm emphasise the need to introduce du-
3 For the purposes of this article, strategy is defined as a direction and mode of action, which a state 
(or other international relations actor) intends to adopt in the long term, in order to achieve its goals and 
gain political advantage. Strategy therefore involves long-term actions taken on the international arena in 
response to changes in international relations, to ensure the country’s long-term survival and improvement 
of its international standing. The term geopolitics is used in the literature in two meanings: either to denote 
a theoretical approach to international relations, or to refer to applied actions taken by different actors in 
the wider social, economic or international context. In the latter usage, the classical geopolitical approach 
involves references to geography and international politics, and thus to the spatial development of relations 
between countries and the role of geographical location in international relations. In more general terms, 
it refers to power and broadly-conceived political actions that involve e. g. the realm of ideas, culture, 
identity, ecology, economics and international relations. In this article I use the term geopolitics primarily 
in relation to the concept of power in international relations and in the context of various types of strategic 
actions that can enhance the autonomy of smaller or peripheral states, and improve their position within the 
international system [1, p. 31, 39; 2, p. 1–14; 3, p. 86–93].
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rable legal regulations and stable international institutions in order to ensure the stability, 
security and increasing the autonomy of the smaller states. The European Union, with its 
high level of institutionalisation, is deemed to play a special role in this process. Interna-
tional organizations (whether active on the regional or global scale) do not operate in a 
geopolitical vacuum. They require support of the leading powers (or of groups of allied 
powers), including prevention of geopolitical and economic crises, and covering the costs 
of stabilization and maintenance of the international system.
In turn, the proponents of the world-systems perspective argue that it is the notion 
of semi-periphery that plays a crucial role for the autonomy of the smaller countries. The 
raison d’être of the semi-peripheries is their defence against degradation to the status of 
peripheries that would be fully dependent on the economic and political centre [6, p. 29]. 
These countries also seek to minimise their distance to the centre, and thus increase their 
autonomy in international relations. The key to success lies primarily in economic de-
velopment. A booming economy gives an opportunity to increase geopolitical potential. 
According to Wallerstein, growth within this paradigm can only be achieved if a country 
abandons the exogenous model of economy4. This includes strengthening protectionist 
support for national businesses in order to help them effectively compete on global mar-
kets. By the same token, a semi-peripheral state, and the efficiency of its administration 
and economic policy become the main stimuli of growth and competitiveness of the local 
economy and of the local accumulation of capital. In essence, this approach is thoroughly 
geo-economic, because it implies that the government’s economic policy should increase 
the country’s autonomy on the international scene. Likewise, according to Rokkan and 
Urwin [8], economic growth, treated as a primary factor of political advancement, is cru-
cial for increasing the autonomy of the peripheral areas. The scholars also point out to 
other important internal conditions, prominent among whom is the cultural potential, 
and especially the ideological invigoration of the local community, based on its shared 
identity, history, language and customs. Rokkan and Urwin also point to the role of local 
elites who can seek paths of promotion and advancement not on the basis of connections 
with the metropolis, but on the basis of the country’s autonomy, at the same time building 
the power of local communities.
In conclusion to the above discussion of relevant theoretical approaches, one can 
posit that the crucial decisions pertaining to the international order, and thus to the fate 
of the smaller countries, are taken by the great powers, especially those aspiring to world 
leadership. Nevertheless, smaller states can still enjoy a modicum of autonomy in their 
decisions. Different scholars point to various factors that allow these countries to increase 
their autonomy, including the growth trajectory of the local economy, the quality of the 
state apparatus and administration, qualifications and career models prevailing among 
the local elites and qualities of the local culture. Regrettably, an analysis of all these factors 
goes beyond the scope of this text. However, in the following part of the article, I am going 
to refer to one key element, namely, strategic choices. In this context, I would like to con-
sider what options of geopolitical strategy are available to the elites of smaller countries.
4 Economic exogeneity in this article is defined as a given economy’s dependence on external funds, 
technologies or aid in order to achieve growth. A country thus becomes dependent on strategic decisions 
made by external actors: either centres of political power or foreign investors [7]. 
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Strategies of smaller states
International relations scholarship contains many analyses of geopolitical strategies, 
though admittedly such analyses mostly focus on the great powers. In the case of choices 
faced by smaller or peripheral states, only some strategies available to great powers are 
practicable (and usually they need to be substantially modified). It seems that the most 
commonly used strategy for smaller states is bandwagoning, i. e. attaching oneself to a great 
power in exchange for support and protection [9; 10; 5, p. 162]. This strategy is like the 
historical institution of patronage. The patron, i. e. a dominant regional or world power, 
offers its client some share of benefits resulting from the power’s privileged position in the 
international order. Two examples of this type of strategy are the close relations between 
Poland and the US after 1989 (especially on the geopolitical plane), and between Poland 
and Germany within the EU (mainly in the economic sphere, in the period 2007–2015). 
The main threat to this strategy is the asymmetrical relationship between the two parties. 
It can result in exploitation of the potential of peripheral country by the dominant partner, 
or forcing the former to bear the costs in return for relatively minor economic benefits. 
It can even lead to deterioration of the overall safety of the weaker partner, especially if 
the dominant partner pursues an expansionary or aggressive policy on the international 
arena. It should be remembered that in an era when great powers possess nuclear weap-
ons, smaller and peripheral countries can easily become the battleground of a military 
conflict between major powers.
Another basic strategy in international relations is called balancing. It is usually de-
fined as an attempt to balance the influence and geopolitical clout of an overly strong actor 
[11; 12; 13, ch. 11]. This strategy can be pursued e. g. by means of alliances designed to 
balance the geopolitical potential of threatening powers. In the case of smaller states, the 
balancing strategy can be applied in two situations. A smaller state can apply it in a situa-
tion of choice between two competing powers or geopolitical systems. However, accord-
ing to the realist theory, this type of action is possible for smaller states only in exceptional 
circumstances and usually for a relatively short period of time. Alternatively, a context 
for using balancing strategy can also arise from escalating rivalry between the powers, or 
from a change of the international system. An example of this scenario is the situation of 
Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the country’s attempts to balance the 
conflicting influences of the US and the EU on one hand and Russia on the other. It ap-
pears that this policy could only be implemented temporarily, and it led to the geopolitical 
conflict that broke out in 2014. If solutions of this type should achieve any durability, they 
must be based on an agreement of the rival powers that divide their zones of influence in 
a specific area or agree to create a geopolitically neutral zone that would be free from the 
unequivocal dominance of either power. An example of such scenario would be the case 
of Finland during the Cold War.
Another variant of balancing strategy available for smaller or peripheral countries is 
an attempt to build an alternative geopolitical core, composed of smaller countries in the 
region. An example of this strategy are various groups and agreements in Central Europe, 
aimed to boost agency and autonomy of the region. The risk of this strategy lies in the 
ephemeral nature of cooperation between countries that individually have only a small 
geopolitical potential. Because every member of the group is continually tempted to throw 
in its lot with some great power (which would potentially give the country more economic 
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or political benefits), smaller states enter into regional cooperation with similarly-sized 
countries in an instrumental way, treating such links as a bargaining chip in other in-
ternational negotiations, and only rarely perceiving such relationships as permanent and 
binding within the region.
A slightly changed variant of this geopolitical strategy is an attempt to “bind” powers. 
This strategy was used through history with respect to powers who attempted to conquer 
or dominate the smaller actors. Powers can be “bound” in a framework of institutional-
ized international cooperation, preferably on a regional scale. An example of this strategy 
is the development of European integration, in particular the creation and development 
of European institutions and European law, which will “bind” the smaller countries and 
the great powers in the same degree. The existence of these institutions may thus serve as 
a way to limit the natural hierarchy of power occurring between the stronger and weaker 
countries. An application of this strategy to the sphere of Polish-Russian relations would 
involve an attempt to promote close cooperation between Russia and European institu-
tions, especially those shaping the EU Eastern policy. The biggest threat to this strategy 
would lie in a scenario in which the largest states seize too much control over the inter-
national institutions and organisations or attempt to use these bodies to reinforce the 
hierarchical relationship between the central and peripheral countries.
Another important geopolitical strategy is buck-passing, which involves pushing 
responsibility to others. It is somewhat similar to maintaining neutrality in geopolitical 
rivalry [14; 15; 5, p. 157–162]. This attitude seems to be completely at odds with the ob-
servable behaviour of Polish policy-makers on the international arena. In truth, Poland’s 
attitude can be seen as the opposite of buck-passing, at least after 2003. In fact, Poland was 
often proactive and “punched above its weight,” particularly when honouring its commit-
ment as US ally in the face of the conflict between Russia and the West. The buck-passing 
strategy is especially effective in periods of mounting tension between rival powers, or in 
situations of an outbreak of armed hostilities between them. The possible benefits of this 
strategy bring to mind a Polish proverb: “Where two are fighting, the third wins”5. An ap-
plication of this strategy involves a waiting game: the smaller country must hope that the 
rivalry between the two powers will result in weakening their potentials, which will lead 
to an increase of geopolitical importance of smaller, or even peripheral, states. The history 
of Poland in the early twentieth century provides a perfect illustration of this strategy, in 
the shape of the conflict between the powers who had partitioned Poland in the late eight-
eenth century. The First World War weakened the potential of all combatants, including 
Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungary, who had orchestrated the three stages of partitions 
of Poland in 1772, 1793 and 1795. As a result, in 1918 it was possible for Poland to reu-
nite and regain independence, and even win war with the Soviet Russia shortly thereafter 
(1919–1921). 
Yet another geopolitical strategy is appeasement, which involves giving in to the de-
mands of the dominant state, which pursues an aggressive or revenge-driven policy on 
the international arena [16, p. 193–194; 17]. The aim of appeasement is finding an ami-
cable solution, and thus ending a conflict without incurring the significant costs of war. 
Appeasement is an especially practicable policy in case of conflicts with countries that 
have decidedly more substantial geopolitical potential, and in a situation where war could 
5 John Mearsheimer also calls this strategy “bait and bleed” [5, p. 153–154].
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result in a loss of sovereignty of the weaker state. A textbook example of appeasement are 
the concessions made by the Czech Republic in answer to the demands of Nazi Germany 
in 1938 (which met with the approval of other great European powers).
Yet another viable geopolitical strategy for smaller states is simply the accumula-
tion of wealth [5, p. 143; 6, p. 29; 18–19], by means of encouraging the growth of national 
economy and strengthening the economic potential, which over time could result in an 
increase of the country’s international position. The necessary condition of implementing 
this strategy is focusing on the endogenous potential of the local economy and reduc-
ing excessive economic dependence on external actors. Another condition is continued 
geopolitical stability and the existence of a stable international order that would facilitate 
economic exchange.
Some scholars also enumerate other factors that can increase the autonomy of a 
smaller state, e. g. the possession of nuclear weapons [20]. However, the process of acquir-
ing such weapons is very time-consuming and costly (and also likely to encounter many 
obstacles from the countries who already possess them). Another possible approach is fo-
cusing a country’s foreign policy actions on coherent ideological message, e. g. one related 
to the country’s historical heritage, highlighting the need for compensation for previous 
wrongs perpetrated by the great powers. This strategy was applied by Poland during its 
membership negotiations with the EU [21].
Poland’s geopolitical choices 
Following the political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe 
initiated in 1989, the cornerstone of Poland’s geopolitical doctrine has been Atlanticism, 
i. e. basing the country’s foreign policy on a close alliance with the USA. Scholars indi-
cate that Poland’s strategy was characteristic of bandwagoning [22, p. 297; 23]. Joining the 
camp of America — the undisputed winner of the Cold War’s made sense, especially when 
one takes into consideration America’s important position in European geopolitics and its 
high impact on the EU. The majority of the Polish scholars and public opinion have per-
ceived the alliance with the US very positively. For all this, some Polish political scientists 
express their negative opinions of this alliance. They point out to the fact that the relation-
ship is highly asymmetrical, and that the US reaps virtually all the benefits, whereas the 
Polish raison d’état is not sufficiently protected or promoted. The critics of the cooperation 
state that Poland does not receive its fair share of political or economic benefits from the 
relationship. The alliance is in fact based on the assumption of Poland’s unquestioning 
loyalty, which significantly weakens the country’s negotiation position every time when a 
divisive issue occurs. What is more, this strategy proves to be costly, and sometimes leads 
to decrease of national security and worsening relations with the EU partners, including 
Poland’s allies in Central Europe [24, p. 65; 22, p. 251–253]. An example of this attitude 
was the support for successive US actions in the Middle East (in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
in 2016–2017 also in Syria), which required the involvement of the military and politi-
cal support without the expected benefits, as promised economic contracts or the visa 
waiver for Polish citizens going to USA. Furthermore these actions led to acute disputes 
with some EU countries, for example with France and Germany in 2003, as well as the 
increased threat of terrorist attacks.
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Moreover, Poland’s strategy leads to excessive dependence on the US, accompanied 
by complete lack of influence over America’s policy [22, p. 298]. Its obvious result is “lack 
of strategic agency and the demotion of Poland to the ranks of America’s satellite states” 
[25]. For some scholars the continued pursuance of bandwagoning strategy proves that 
Poland is not adept at defining its own strategic interests, formulating a comprehensive 
and coherent foreign policy and implementing strategic thinking. It also shows that it is 
impossible for Poland to “maintain a serious, non-partisan debate about foreign policy 
objectives that would be autonomous, and free from external influences” [24, p. 68, 69].
The scholars prove the shallowing of strategic vision primarily to bandwagoning to 
US is a permanent element of Polish foreign policy after 1989, that can be associated with 
all successive governments and virtually all top-ranking officials and policy-makers [22, 
p. 300; 24, p. 63]. It can be linked to the model of peripheral state. In such a setup, the 
initiative is usually shown by the leading powers and the role of the smaller countries is 
often reactive and dependant on the great powers policy demands. In the reported model 
a smaller state can have its own strategic objectives but most important of them could be 
implemented only with the support of the great power. Geopolitical projects undertaken 
by the Polish government on the international arena are often inspired by the US as the 
political patron, or at least are greenlit by the Americans [26, p. 394; 24, p. 68]. For this rea-
son, the calculation of benefits and costs of the alliance is skewed in favour of the USA. Po-
land’s actions as a loyal ally do not always seem aligned with the country’s best interest. 
According to the scholars [27, p. 136; 22, p. 319], Polish foreign policy shows a marked 
tendency for grandstanding and swagger, without taking into account to the country’s 
real geopolitical standing or potential. An example of these conflicting tendencies are the 
relations with Russia, wherein Poland’s actions often do not take into account the obvi-
ous difference of geopolitical potentials between the two countries. Since the escalation of 
conflict in Ukraine in 2013, Poland’s support for Ukraine resulted in increasing economic 
losses (for instance economic sanctions imposed by Russia) and geopolitical risk of fur-
ther destabilisation on its Eastern frontier. 
The relationship between the US and Poland, as described above, has numerous rami-
fications for Poland’s position and behaviour on the EU arena. It is not a coincidence 
that Poland is perceived by its European partners as America’s staunch ally in all matters 
related to EU policies. A case in point is primarily Poland’s strong support for fostering 
transatlantic relations between the EU and America, including the presence of NATO 
and American troops in Europe. Poland has repeatedly voiced an opinion that NATO 
plays a leading role in maintaining security of the EU. Poland has also been working in 
order to bring about the expansion of both NATO and the EU to the east, in order to 
incorporate such countries as Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans [26, 
p. 412–414]. Precisely because of loyalty towards the US, Poland was also initially reluc-
tant towards the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy6, especially 
since the project was interpreted as an attempt to increase the autonomy of the EU in its 
relations with NATO and the United States. Incidentally, Poland eventually performed a 
complete U-turn and became an active proponent of this policy, treated as a European 
“pillar” of NATO [22, p. 206; 27, p. 117, 125–127, 136]. Another important consequence of 
6 Before signing the Treaty of Lisbon, it was called European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
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the Polish-American relations is Poland’s Eastern policy, and especially Poland’s attempts 
to influence the EU policy in this direction [26, p. 411]. 
Poland’s accession into the EU in 2004 was a fundamental decision that had multiple 
geopolitical objectives. Its most important result was naturally forging stronger ties with 
the West, including further strengthening of cooperation within NATO, and deepening 
the alliance with the US, which was the cornerstone of Polish foreign policy. The United 
States supported not only Poland’s membership in NATO, but also in the EU. This was to 
cement the Polish relations with the West, but also more strongly connect the EU with the 
US. Joining the EU was also meant to stabilize relations with Germany, Poland’s neigh-
bour but also its long-time historical rival. Now the two countries would forge closer ties 
in the broader context of EU institutions. Finally, in a more long-term perspective, Po-
land’s objective was to use the EU potential and institutions in order to shape EU’s Eastern 
policy in line with Warsaw’s geopolitical agenda. The Eastern policy is one of Poland’s 
priority interests in the EU, which was evidenced by the launch of the Eastern Partnership, 
a joined initiative of Poland and Sweden, adopted by the EU Council in 2008. The goal of 
the Eastern Partnership was to utilise the EU instruments in order to influence Poland’s 
Eastern neighbours, and bind them more closely to the EU, creating an outermost circle 
of influence and a buffer zone between the EU and Russia [28, p. 423]. The EU used soft 
means of influence, including fostering economic relations, creating investment incen-
tives, offering aid, and promoting Western political ideas and European regulations.
The launch of the Eastern Partnership was undoubtedly a success of Polish diplo-
macy, even if its effects were somewhat superficial [28, p. 426]. From the point of view 
of the Eastern partners, the benefits of the Partnership were not sufficiently attractive, 
as it did not constitute a track to EU membership. The volume of financial aid was also 
relatively small [29]. While it can be said that the possibility of accessing the EU internal 
market was an attractive incentive for Eastern business entities, they could only do so if 
they adhered to EU norms and regulations (which was discouraging for many). Addition-
ally, fierce competition on the EU market meant that this possibility was not as attractive 
for Eastern actors as it might have been. 
The Eastern Partnership intended to provide an avenue for discussions of trade, eco-
nomic strategy, travel agreements and other issues between the EU and its Eastern Eu-
ropean neighbours. The Partnership was to deliver the foundation for new Association 
Agreements between the EU and its partners. But the negotiation of Association Agree-
ments proceeded extremely slowly, and the final stages were only achieved after the out-
break of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. The EU signed Association Agreement treaties with 
Georgia and Moldova in 2016 and with Ukraine in 2017. Regardless of the sluggishness 
the Polish administration (even though the launch of the Partnership was a Polish sugges-
tion), it soon transpired that other countries have an axe to grind in this matter. For vari-
ous reasons and in various degrees, Germany, France and Russia were generally hostile 
towards the Partnership [28, p. 435–437]. The case of the Eastern Partnership illustrates 
the great powers’ actual level of influence over EU initiatives that could potentially have 
important geopolitical implications.
One should also remember that the EU Eastern policy promoted by Poland contrib-
uted to weakening the relationships between the EU’s Eastern neighbours and Russia, 
which was treated by the Kremlin as an intrusion into Russia’s geopolitical domain of 
influence. The Eastern policy proposed by Poland had been inspired by the thought of 
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Jerzy Giedroyc and Juliusz Mieroszewski, according to whom Poland’s strategic objective 
should be weakening Russia. To this end, Warsaw should try to “prize” its neighbours 
from the Russian sphere of influence and bind them to Poland (in the case of the Eastern 
Partnership, this would be done using the EU instruments)7. As one scholar claims, the 
post-1989 Poland “has not formulated any comprehensive Eastern doctrine other than the 
Promethean vision outlined by Giedroyć” [32, p. 153]. 
The fundamental weakness of Poland’s Eastern strategy is its complete disregard for 
the actions and objectives of Russia, which remains the region’s biggest power. It is also 
difficult to imagine that Poland could pursue its policy in relations with Russia without 
incurring significant costs, especially as the geopolitical potentials of the two countries are 
completely disproportionate. For this reason, a more productive strategy for Poland would 
be seeking to stabilise the situation beyond its borders, and in the long-term, attempting 
to “bind” Russia with Europe and integrate it closer with the EU structures. Poland could 
also try use the Russian market as an outlet for Polish products, thus fostering its own 
economic growth and increasing the geopolitical importance of Warsaw. The currently 
pursued policy of weakening the Russian sphere of influence, thus reducing Russia’s geo-
political status, seems too ambitious and well beyond Poland’s present capabilities. What 
is more, Poland’s agenda is perceived as threatening or as being out of line with the EU 
interests by many European Member States (even in Central Europe). But, it seems, to be 
consistent with the strategy of Washington, at least after 2012 (when Putin was elected 
President for a third term). All in all, Poland’s Eastern policy is the absolute opposite of 
buck-passing (i. e. maintaining passivity and pushing the responsibility to other actors). It 
also does not have the marks of a balancing strategy, wherein Poland would try to balance 
the power of Russia by binding it more and more closely to the European Union. It seems 
that Poland pursues a bandwagoning strategy, binding itself very closely to America as its 
dominant partner. 
Some scholars argue that the dominant strategy of the member states on the EU fo-
rum is a flexible exchange of temporary alliances, which are forged around a particular 
issue, and then disband [33, p. 502]. This policy could have its uses in the first period of 
Poland’s membership, when Polish decision-makers had a stance that was not only pro-
American, but was also characterised by a marked distrust towards Germany and a reluc-
tance against deepening the integration with the EU (and hence was sometimes explicitly 
called Eurosceptic) [22, p. 207, 282; 26, p. 399]. However, since 2007 (and until 2015), Pol-
ish government pursued its EU policy in close cooperation with Germany8, endeavouring 
to maximise Poland’s influence in the EU, but also becoming supporter of the German 
agenda within the European Union9. Again, Poland’s actions seem to follow a bandwag-
oning strategy (this time with Germany as the dominant partner). Poland’s cooperation 
with Germany was focused solely on internal EU issues and economic matters, and seems 
to be only of secondary importance for Poland’s decision-makers in comparison with the 
all-important American alliance. 
7 Such ideas were proposed and promoted e. g. by government think tanks (The Polish Institute of 
International Affairs (PISM) and The Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)) and by some political scientists 
[30–31]. 
8 The cooperation effectively ended after the change of government in 2015 [28, p. 433].
9 For example, Poland’s presence in the Weimar Triangle was often perceived as a boost of Germany’s 
position in relation to France [26, p. 398].
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Another geopolitical development are the attempts to shape alliances in Central Eu-
rope. The most important of these is the Visegrad Group, which dates back to 1991. The 
obvious goal of stronger cooperation in Central Europe was strengthening the role of 
Poland both in the region and on the European arena [26, p. 400; 34, p. 372]. However, Po-
land’s instrumental approach to fostering regional cooperation has often been jarring for 
smaller states, who accused Warsaw of dearth of real commitment to the region’s future 
and of being too forceful in promoting its own agenda. Two ideas on which Warsaw was 
adamant were harnessing the Visegrad Group into supporting Poland’s vision of Eastern 
policy, and widening the regional cooperation to include more countries such as the Bal-
tics and countries participating in the Eastern Partnership [34, p. 376–377].
Scholars point out that the effectiveness of the Visegrad Group (the so-called V4) was 
startlingly low. Though over the years the Group managed to cooperate on a range of is-
sues (including the EU cohesion policy and foreign and defence policies), the level of co-
operation was usually relatively low, and tended to be limited to political rhetoric and dec-
larations [24, p. 62; 34, p. 366, 378]. The interests of the V4 countries were diverse, and this 
fact was often used by the great powers, when they wanted to destroy the Group’s unity 
for their purposes. Some partners also took objection to what they perceived as excessive 
pro-American or anti-Russian stance of the Polish government. As a result, Poland’s at-
tempts to build a regional geopolitical core in order to balance the influence of the biggest 
regional powers turned out to be quite unsuccessful. This strategy was also of secondary 
importance, as bandwagoning took clear precedence.
Yet another initiative taken on the geopolitical plane were the attempts to counteract 
divisions within the EU, mainly opposing the processes of differentiated integration be-
tween the euro area and the rest of the member states. In view of the Polish elites, such 
division could lead to further strengthening the European centre and sealing other coun-
tries’ peripheral status. Therefore, such attempts can be regarded as manifestations of the 
balancing strategy. Initially, Polish government announced that it was going to put the 
country on the fast track to the monetary union (in 2008, the Prime Minister Donald Tusk 
unexpectedly announced Poland’s readiness to enter the eurozone in 2012). However, the 
deepening economic crisis in Western Europe put a check on these ambitious plans. The 
government decided to postpone the decision on entering the euro area, and at the same 
time it was trying to be involved in the initiatives undertaken during the crisis, whose 
goal it was to reform and strengthen the monetary union. Such actions can collectively be 
described as “leaving one’s options open.” Polish authorities were joining all subsequent 
anti-crisis initiatives (the Euro-Plus Pact, the Fiscal Comact, the Banking Union etc.). In 
2012, the Polish government adopted a resolution saying that Poland will enter the com-
mon currency system only when both sides will be ready. In other words, Poland will not 
enter the eurozone until the country’s economy will not have shown symptoms of increase 
in competitiveness, and until the euro area will not have recovered from the crisis [26, 
p. 405–410]. It should also be noted that Berlin supported strengthening Poland’s ties with 
the euro area and Poland’s attempts to become part of the subsequent anti-crisis initia-
tives, even though the Polish government was delaying its final decision to adopt the com-
mon currency. Poland’s policy of “keeping its options open” was actually feasible thanks to 
the strong support of Germany, and therefore — thanks bandwagoning. Once again, this 
geopolitical strategy proved its effectiveness. Other Polish geopolitical actions can either 
supplement it or are of only secondary importance. 
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2018. Т. 11. Вып. 2 181
Conclusion
The new right-wing government after 2015 elections came into sharp conflict with 
the European institutions on compliance with the EU values, including the rule of law and 
democratic principles. It also had a completely different vision for the future of the EU 
from the most of other member states. It wanted to reduce and re-nationalize EU powers 
instead of further advancement of integration. Against this background, the relationships 
between the Polish and the German governments have cooled considerably. In particular, 
the Polish authorities have distanced themselves from the German proposals for integra-
tion progress in the field of defense policy, recognizing that they would be a strategic 
challenge for the NATO and the US presence in the region. In 2017 Poland eventually 
joined the Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) but only in two out of 17 projects 
of this form of collaboration in the Common Security and Defense Policy. In these condi-
tions, the Polish government’s policy aimed to strengthen cooperation within the Central 
Europe (the Visegrad Group and the Three Seas Initiative), as well as within transatlantic 
relations.
The alliance with the USA has been the cornerstone of Poland’s foreign policy since 
the 1989  transformation, and the bandwagoning strategy in relation to America as the 
dominant partner took centre stage, and overshadowed all other strategic actions. It was 
by far more important than the alliance with Berlin and intermittent attempts to build a 
regional geopolitical centre of power in Central Europe. As I said above, before 2015 Po-
land treated the Visegrad Group rather instrumentally, and used its leading role in the 
Group often as a tool to boost its own international standing, without too much concern 
for the Group’s future. Smaller countries in the region resented this attitude, and for this 
reason they sought alternative political alliances, either bilateral or region-wide (but with-
out Poland). An example of such an initiative is the Slavkov Triangle — an alliance of 
Austria, Czech Republic and Slovakia, whose launch can be seen among others as a result 
of dissatisfaction with the confrontational attitude of the Polish authorities with regard to 
the conflict in Ukraine [35].
In conclusion, Poland’s reliance on bandwagoning strategy can be seen as moderately 
successful, but it also comes at a cost, and may lead to increased risks to national security. 
Poland’s actions show no evidence of employing other geopolitical strategies, such as buck-
passing (maintaining passivity and pushing the responsibility to others), or appeasement. 
To a small degree, it utilised balancing, but Poland’s balancing actions were only of sec-
ondary importance, and they were always subordinated to the primary geopolitical strat-
egy. Polish decision-makers seem to neglect one of the most promising strategic actions 
that can be implemented by smaller or peripheral states, namely geoeconomic support of 
the domestic economy in order to strengthen the country’s geopolitical potential. Poland’s 
economic policy relied on creating incentives for foreign investors and on absorption of 
EU aid in the spheres of agricultural policy and cohesion. Even though this policy resulted 
in GDP growth and a boost of domestic demand, it did not lead to deep structural changes 
and sustainable increase of the competitiveness of Polish economy. To the contrary, it con-
tributed to increasing economic dependence on external inflow of capital and technology 
and reliance on the European centre [36–38]. In addition, the economic advantages of 
low production costs in Poland could run out over time, especially when wages or energy 
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costs would increase [39]. A sign of this trend may be weakening of productivity of the 
economy and the growing threat of so-called “middle income trap”10.
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